The County Court has dismissed a claim for misfeasance in public office and vicarious liability brought against the Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire Police, arising from the actions of a former police constable, Craig Stant.

The Claimant, Ms A, alleged that while off duty the officer had pursued an inappropriate and coercive relationship with her after stopping her car and identifying himself as a police officer. She claimed that in doing so the officer was purporting to act in the course of his public duties and that the Chief Constable was therefore vicariously liable for his actions. The Chief Constable had dismissed the officer because of his actions towards Ms A. Damages were sought for misfeasance, personal injury, and aggravated and exemplary damages.

R (Ferguson) v  HM Assistant Coroner for Sefton, Knowsley & St Helens and the Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2025] EWHC 1901 (Admin) 23 July 2025 –  judgment here

Q1: What strength of evidence will make it arguable that an article 2 duty has arisen and/or make it arguable that a duty has been breached, so as to trigger an Art 2 compliant inquest?

Q2: For a mandatory jury to be required need there be an inappropriate act or omission by police, or is their mere involvement enough?

The answer to both these questions is now clarified in this latest Judicial Review decision from the High Court which underlines how, in respect of the “low arguability threshold” for Article 2 engagement, low really does mean low.

Her Ladyship’s “Article 2 in overview” section (see paras 14-37) is a clear and helpful exposition of the relevant law on the engagement of Art 2 procedural duties. Indeed, inquest practitioners might as well just copy and paste the text into their skeleton arguments (or coroners into their own judgments) to save themselves a lot of time.

It would be ridiculously presumptuous for this blog to even try to summarise it any further, beyond noting that Hill J clarifies that the low threshold of ‘arguability’ which will engage the procedural Article 2 duty applies not only to the question of any breach of a substantive art 2 duty, but also to whether any duty arises in the first place.

The meat of this case is, as with many cases, the application of the law to the unique facts and looking at whether the coroner had correctly applied that low arguability threshold in coming to his decision.

R (Metropolitan Police Commissioner) v Police Conduct Panel [2025] EWHC 1462 (Admin)  17 June 2025,  judgment here

Skeleton arguments and written submissions are often emailed to coroners in advance of an inquest or PIRH.  The document is rarely read out in court in full, and so any press or public sitting in court may find the resulting arguments extremely difficult to understand or follow when only partial extracts from the written document are elliptically referred to in oral submissions.

In such circumstances how are those who are entitled to attend the open public inquest hearing supposed to understand the arguments relied upon by the different interested persons or to make sense of the coroner’s ruling on a relevant matter?

This recent decision by Fordham J, reminds us that, whatever the forum, open justice requires judges and tribunals to ordinarily make skeleton arguments relied upon at a public hearing available to the press promptly if requested at that hearing.  To do so promotes open justice, as to both public scrutiny and intelligibility. It also promotes contemporaneous reporting and public confidence.

Tindall and another v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police [2024] UKSC 33, (judgment here)

It is not coronial law under the microscope here, but rather a decision from the Supreme Court at the end of last year in a police civil action.  Nevertheless it provides helpful insight into the potential responsibility of police forces in their deployment to incidents that coroners and inquest practitioners will need to bear in mind should  a neglect or gross negligence manslaughter/unlawful killing conclusion be under consideration.

The Supreme Court was concerned with the test for the imposition of a duty of care in a civil claim for compensation.  The Court considered the elusive dividing line between ‘failing to protect a person from harm’ (where no duty of care arises) and ‘making matters worse’ (when a duty does bite). The Court acknowledged that drawing this distinction is “not always straightforward” [1] – which is perhaps something of an under-statement!

Barnes v Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police, is an important professional discipline case considering the power of the Chief Constable to discharge a probationary officer, notwithstanding misconduct proceedings relating to the same officer and the same concerns did not result in dismissal.

Facts

The claimant had told a racist joke to colleagues, which he knew was inappropriate and racist. He was subjected to disciplinary action pursuant to the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 and Home Office guidance, in which a panel chaired by an independent lawyer found the conduct amounted to misconduct rather than gross misconduct, and imposed a written warning.

The Chief Constable decided, following those proceedings, that the claimant’s probation should be extended and that he should be subjected to performance-type proceedings – regulation 13, Police Regulations 2003 – to consider whether he should be confirmed as a full police constable officeholder, or not.

A senior officer recommended that the claimant should be confirmed as an officer, given that the incident had been a one-off, the claimant had strong testimonials, and he had not been dismissed by the disciplinary panel which had considered the same facts.

The Chief Constable disagreed, and exercised the power reserved to him to discharge the claimant from probationary office, due to the seriousness of the conduct in telling the racist joke, what it said about his future as a police constable and the risk to public confidence.

In his written reasons, the Chief Constable expressed surprise at the decision of the disciplinary panel and was critical of the claimant’s mitigation and insight.

Decision

The claimant challenged that decision in judicial review proceedings on grounds of irrationality, estoppel, breach of legitimate expectation and procedural fairness. An interim injunction application to keep the claimant in office failed, and the High Court has now decided that the claim should be rejected on all grounds.

The Judge (Lavender J) noted there was “… no authority which has considered the situation which arose in the present case, where the same matter gave rise to both misconduct proceedings, resulting in a finding of misconduct and a sanction falling short of dismissal, and a subsequent decision to discharge a probationary constable pursuant to Regulation 13 …” (para. 34)

The judgment analyses the leading cases of R. (Coke-Wallis) v Institute of Chartered Accountants [2011] 2 A.C. 146 (cause of action estoppel in professional disciplinary proceedings) and Christou v Haringey London Borough Council[2014] Q.B. 131 (re-opening employment discipline allegations following public interest reviews).

The High Court concluded that the Chief Constable, in taking an important managerial decision reserved to him, was not acting as a litigant or judicial tribunal duplicating disciplinary proceedings, so cause of action estoppel and the collateral attack doctrine did not apply.

It was also not unfair or irrational, in the circumstances, for the Chief Constable to take a different view to earlier decision-makers as to the seriousness of the claimant’s conduct, and the extent of his remorse and insight.

Further, it was not unfair to take the discharge decision on the papers, without giving the claimant a (further) hearing or sharing a provisional decision. The claimant had in substance known the evidence and points which may be said against him, had the opportunity to make representations, and the Chief Constable relied on no new matter.

Analysis

The High Court’s decision does not, of course, permit police forces to bypass the important procedural fairness protections in disciplinary regulations, when conduct allegations are in dispute. The judgment does, however, recognise the important role for Chief Constables, as heads of their organisations in respect of recruitment, appointment and probation.

All the more so when considered together with the recent High Court decision in Victor v Chief Constable of West Mercia Police, which related to successive decisions about discipline, vetting clearance and discharge from probationary office.