Police Law Blog European Decisions Statutory Materials

Costs and Compensation in Closure Orders

Where the police are unsuccessful in a closure order application there is no presumption that there be no order compensating the Respondent for financial loss. Unlike when considering the position on costs, the court’s focus on an application for compensation should be on the respondent’s behaviour, not that of the police, so held the Administrative Court in R (Qin) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2017] EWHC 2750 (Admin).

Tagging requirements in SOPOs are lawful

In R (on the application of Richards) v Chief Constable of Cleveland Police (UKSC 2017/0090) the Supreme Court has refused permission to appeal against the imposition of a tagging requirement in a Sexual Offences Prevention Order (“SOPO”).  The undisturbed judgment of the Court of Appeal in R (on the application of Richards) v Teesside Magistrates’ Court [2015] EWCA Civ 7; [2015] 1 WLR 1695 endorses (and perhaps extends) the purpose and effect of imposing qualified restrictions on sex offenders.

Liability of police misconduct hearings for discrimination

The Supreme Court has held in P v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2017] UKSC 65, that police misconduct hearings no longer benefit from judicial immunity in respect of discrimination claims. They also held that the Chief Constable is vicariously liable for the discriminatory acts of such panels. However, the decision related to an internal panel under the old regime when a misconduct hearing panel was chaired by an assistant chief constable. Three awkward issues arise:

  • Whether its reasoning applies to panels chaired by a Legally Qualified Chair (‘LQC’) under the new regime;
  • If so, whether the Chief Constable is legally responsible for the acts of an independent panel or whether the LQC and the other members of such panels would be liable as a panel;
  • If the LQC and panel members are potentially liable in damages in their own names, regardless.

Given up the Ghosh? Dishonesty in police misconduct hearings

The explanation of dishonesty to a misconduct panel has always had the air of artificiality about it. That is not just my view – in its upending of the test in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords [2017] UKSC 67, the Supreme Court described the test at [57] as being one “which jurors and others often find puzzling and difficult to apply.” In that decision, the Supreme Court upended the Ghosh test, which should no longer be used in misconduct proceedings. What might remain a live question, however, is whether the objective standard is those of ordinary, honest people or ordinary honest police officers.